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SHAPERO - DIRECT MAIL CLARIFIED
by
WILLIAM C. BECKER*
INTRODUCrION
In June, 1988' the Supreme Court handed down a decision which the bar had
eagerly awaited. Now, the evolving, slippery subject of lawyer advertising and
solicitation has been clarified further. This article examines several cases involving
attorney advertising and provides a general overview of acceptable and non-
acceptable methods of advertising by direct mail.
THE SHAPERO CASE
In this recent Kentucky case, the plaintiff applied to the Kentucky Attorneys'
Advertising Commission,2 pursuant to provisions in the rules of the Kentucky
Supreme Court, for permission to send the following letter to potential clients:
3
It has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on. If this is
true, you may be about to lose your home. Federal law may allow you to keep
your home by ORDERING your creditor (sic) to STOP and give you more
time to pay them.
You may call my office any time from 8:30 a.m. to 5 p.m. for FREE infor-
mation on how you can keep your home.
Call NOW, don't wait. It may surprise you what I may be able to do for you.
Just call and tell me that you got this letter. Remember it is FREE, there is
NO CHARGE for calling4
Although the Commission did not find the letter false or misleading,5 it de-
clined to approve it on the ground that Kentucky Supreme Court rule 3.135(5)(B)(1)
prohibited the mailing or delivery of written advertisements "precipitated by a
specific event or occurrence involving or relating to the addressee ... as distinct
from the general public." 6 The Commission registered its view that Kentucky rule
(3.135)(5)(3)(I) violated the first amendment, particularly the principles enun-
ciated in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council of the Supreme Court of Ohio7
and recommended to the Supreme Court of Kentucky that the rule be changed
or amended.'
*Professor of Law, The University of Akron School of Law. Harvard University, A.B.; University of Michigan, J.D.
IShapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988).
21d. at 1917.
3Id.
41d.
5Id.
61d. at 1917.
7471 U.S. 626 (1985).
8Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1920. 199
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Subsequently, Shapero petitioned the Committee on Legal Ethics of the Ken-
tucky Bar Association for an advisory opinion as to the validity of the rule? While
the Committee did not find Mr. Shapero's letter false or misleading, it upheld the
ban on the ground that it was consistent with Rule 7.3 of the Model Rules. l0 Upon
review of the Ethics Committee's advisory opinion, the Kentucky Supreme Court
felt compelled by Zauderer to uphold the bar and to delete Rule 3.135(5)(B)(I),
replacing it with Model Rule 7.3. and upheld the ban.'" Kentucky's Supreme Court
concluded that the ban on targeted, direct mail solicitation was permissible
because of the "serious potential for abuse inherent to direct solicitation by lawyers
of potential clients known to need specific legal services." 
1 2
Model Rule 7.3 states: "The term 'solicit' includes contact in person, by tel-
ephone or telegraph, by letter or other writing, or by other communication di-
rected to a specific recipient, but does not include letters addressed or advertis-
ing circulars distributed generally to persons not known to need legal ser-
vices...... I ' In short, this rule prohibits lawyers from targeted mail solicitation
for pecuniary gain.' 4
The United States Supreme Court has noted that "our lawyer advertising cases
have never distinguished among various modes of written advertising to the
general public" ' 5 and that absent false or misleading information, Mr. Shapero
could not be prevented from sending his letter addressed generally to members
of the public.' 6 On the issue of whether there could or should be a distinction for
letters which are targeted, the Court states that the "First Amendment does not
permit a ban on certain speech merely because it is more efficient. The State may
not constitutionally ban a particular letter on the theory that to mail it only to those
whom it would most interest is somehow inherently objectionable." 17
The Supreme Court further clarified this point, holding that: "The relevant
inquiry is not whether there exists potential clients whose 'condition' makes them
susceptible to undue influence, but whether the mode of communication poses
a serious danger that lawyers will exploit any such susceptibility." ' 8 The Court
continues to characterize face-to-face solicitation as a "practice rife with
possibilities for overreaching, invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue influence
and outright fraud." 19 Regulation of in person solicitation is obviously quite dif-
91d.
1
0 d.
IIShapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 726 SW.2d 299, 300 (Ky. 1987).
12726 S.W.2d at 301.
13M. at 301.
'
4Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1920.
15 d. at 1921.
16d
171d. at 1921-22.
18Shapero, 108 S. Ct. at 1922.
19d. at 1922 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626, 641 (1985)).
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ficult, making an outright ban acceptable.2 ° However, the Court does not find suf-
ficient risk of overreaching or undue influence in subject advertising or direct mail
solicitation, 2' because the potential client can simply ignore the letter. 2 "[Mierely
because targeted, direct-mail solicitation presents lawyers with opportunities for
isolated abuses or mistakes does not justify a total ban on that mode of protected
commercial speech.23 The State can regulate such abuses and minimize mistakes
through far less restrictive and more precise means, the most obvious of which
is to require the lawyer to file any solicitation letter with a state agency."
24
Finally, the Court turns to specific objections, such as puffery,25 and finds
"no substantial interest in restricting truthful and nondeceptive lawyer solicita-
tions to those least likely to be read by the recipient" 26 Additionally, the Court
recognizes that there may be some situations in which a letter may be misleading
"if it unduly emphasizes trivial or 'relatively' uninformative fact(s)" 27 or "offers
overblown assurances of client satisfaction." 2
8
In short, targeted, direct-mail which is neither false nor misleading, may not
be restricted in a blanket fashion although it may be regulated.2 9
In her dissenting opinion Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice Scalia, criticizes the majority's unwillingness to "restrain the
logic of their underlying analysis" of lawyer advertising 0 The dissent speaks to
the continuing question of deference to the states in their attempt to regulate pro-
fessional conduct and expresses concern with lawyer advice contained in un-
solicited "free samples" which may "be colored by the lawyer's own interest in
drumming up business." 3 A personalized letter is "somewhat more likely 'to over-
power the will and judgment of laypeople who have not sought [the lawyer's] ad-
vice."' 32 Justice O'Connor notes that personalized letters are designed "to sug-
gest that the sender has some significant personal knowledge about, and concern
for the recipient" 33 and that targeted "mailings" are more likely than general
20 d. (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council. 471 U.S. 626, 641 (1985) at 641; Ohralik v. Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 466 (1978)).
21 d. at 1922.
221d. at 1923.
231d.
241d.
251d. at 1924.
261d.
27Id. at 1925 (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 205 (1982)).
28 d. at 1925.
291d. at 1923.
30/d. at 1925.
3Id. at 1925-26.
32Id. at 1926 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Council, 471 U.S. 626, 678 (1985), (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part)).
33d. at 1926.
Fall, 1988]
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advertisements to contain advice that is unduly tailored to serve the pecuniary
interests of the lawyer." 34 "[T]he latest developments, in Zauderer and now to-
day, confirm that the Court should apply its commercial speech doctrine with
more discernment than it has shown in these cases." 35
Applying the test to attorney advertising, it is clear to me that the states should
have considerable latitude to ban advertising that is 'potentially or
demonstratively misleading' . . . as well as truthful advertising that under-
mines the substantial governmental interest in promoting the high ethical
standards that are necessary in the legal profession.
3 6
Moreover, "solicitation practices like the 'free sample' techniques approved by
Zauderer and today's decision are even less deserving of constitutional protec-
tion than price advertising for supposedly routine legal services." 
37
Justice O'Connor finds "[t]he roots of the error in our attorney advertising
cases are a defective analogy between professional services and standardized con-
sumer products and a correspondingly inappropriate skepticism about the states'
justification for their regulations." 38 Justice O'Connor believes that the profes-
sion is special and that the goals of the profession must "transcend(s) the accumu-
lation of wealth " 3 9 "Special ethical standards for lawyers are properly understood
as an appropriate means of restraining lawyers in the exercise of the unique power
that they inevitably wield in a political system like ours." 40 "Imbuing the legal
profession with the necessary ethical standards is a task that involves a constant
struggle with the relentless natural force of economic self-interest." Finally, Justice
O'Connor predicts "in one way or another time will uncover the folly of this (the
majority) approach." 4'
FROM BATES To ZAUDERER
In reviewing Shapero, it is necessary to place both the case and the activities
which it covers into perspective within the overall subject of lawyer advertising
and soliciting. To do this, it is necessary to review the key Supreme Court pro-
nouncements in this field from Bates to Zauderer. 42 Thus, it is worthwhile to sum-
marize this obligatory trek from Bates to Zauderer,43 with side references to
34 1d.
35Id. at 1927.
361d. at 1927-28 (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982).
311d. at 1928.
381d. at 1928-29.
391d. at 1929-30.
401d. at 1930.
41 1d. at 1931.
42Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
43See Perschbacher, Reading Beyond The Labels: Effective Regulation of Lawyers' Targeted Direct Mail Adver-
tising, 58 U. COLO L. REV. 255 (1987).
[Vol. 22:2AKRON LAW REVIEW
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Virginia Pharmacy,44 Goldfarb, 4 and Central Hudson. 46
Bates
At times we forget that the birth of the attorney advertising debate in Bates
began only eleven years ago, in 1977. After a very modest suspension (one week
each) for violating D.R. 2-101(B)" 7 two Arizona lawyers took their case to the
Supreme Court. Their violation involved a newspaper ad which featured set prices
for routine legal matters."8 The Supreme Court held that blanket prohibition of
legal advertising was inappropriate because such a ban ran afoul of the advertiser's
first amendment rights." 9
Advertising which was not false or misleading had no adverse effect on pro-
fessionalism, 0 or on the administration ofjustice (in fact it offered benefits)5 1 and
it was "entirely possible that advertising will serve to reduce, not advance, the
cost of legal services to the consumer." 52 The Court did not reach the question
of advertising having to do with the quality of service,53 and noted, without deci-
sion, the special problems of electronic advertising 4 It upheld banning false,
deceptive or misleading advertising."5
In re R.M.J.
In re R. M.J. ,56 considered the Missouri Bar's attempt to closely define per-
missible information in advertising. In this case the lawyer used language to
describe his practice which differed from the language set forth in the specific
provisions governing permissible advertising. 7 He also stated in his ad that he
had been admitted to practice in two states and before the Supreme Court; neither
were permitted . 8
44Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (price
advertising).
4 5Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (minimum fee schedules).
46Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (standards for com-
mercial speech).
47Bates, 433 U.S. at 355-56.
48Id. at 354.
"91d. at 384.
50 d. at 368-71.
511d. at 376.
521d. at 377.
53d. at 383-84.
541d. at 384.
55d. at 383. It is interesting to look at the ad which Bates usesd and contrast it with today's yellow pages under
the "Attorney" listing.
56455 U.S. 191 (1982).
171d. at 196-97.
SSd. at 197.
Fall, 19881
5
Becker: Shapero - Direct Mail Clarified
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1989
The court ruled that "States may not place an absolute prohibition on cer-
tain types of potentially misleading information" 59 but recognized that information
must be set forth in a manner that is not deceptive 60 and, that appropriate dis-
claimers may be required in certain instances.6' This case led Ohio, to change its
very detailed DR2-101(B) to the present simplified version proscribing false or
misleading advertising.62
Ohralik
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association63 presents a 1978 case on the other end
of the continuum. In Ohralik, a person-to-person solicitation took place. There,
an attorney visited and was retained by a client while the client was in traction
in a hospital bed.64 The lawyer argued that his activity was indistinguishable from
Bates, and merely another form of advertising.65 The Court held that "[I]n such
a situation, which is inherently conducive to overreaching and other forms of
misconduct, the State has a strong interest in adopting and enforcing rules of con-
duct designed to protect the public from harmful solicitation by lawyers whom
it has licensed." 66
In re Primus
In re Primus,6 7 was decided at the same time as Ohralik. In this case, the
disciplined attorney was practicing in Columbia, South Carolina and associated
with "Carolina Community Law Firm" as well as being an officer with the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) 68 "She received no compensation for
her work on behalf of the ACLU."
69
In 1973, Primus addressed a meeting of potential claimants, of women who
had been sterilized as a condition of the continued receipt of medical assistance
under the Medicaid program70 At the meeting, Primus advised the women that
591d. at 203.
601d.
61Id. (citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 375 (1977)).
62The rule now provides:
A lawyer shall not, on behalf of himself, his partner, associate or any other lawyer affiliated with or
his firm, use, or participate in the use of, any form of public communication containing a false,
fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive statement or claim.
OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 2-101(A) (1987).
63436 U.S. 447 (1978).
641d. at 449-50.
651d. at 455.
66 d. at 464.
67436 U.S. 412 (1978).
68 d. at 414.
69 d. at 414-15.
70 d. at 416.
[Vol. 22:2AKRON LAW REVIEW
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they had specific legal rights and suggested the possibility of a lawsuit.7 ' Subse-
quently, she addressed a letter to one of the women who had attended the meeting,
suggesting that the ACLU would be willing to file a free lawsuit on her behalf?
2
The Court found the Primus letter "within the generous zone of First Amend-
ment protection reserved for associational freedoms." 73 Furthermore, it stated
that "the rules in their present form have a distinct potential for dampening the
kind of 'cooperative' activity that would make advocacy of litigation meaningful 74
. . . as well as for permitting discretionary enforcement against unpopular
causes ' 75 Ohralik did not control. In the final analysis, Primus was not face-to-
face solicitation. Nor was it solicitation for remuneration. 6 In fact, the Court held
that Primus "by contrast, show(s) a 'solicitation' of employment in accordance
with the highest standards of the legal profession." 77 In the interest of protecting
associational freedoms and recognizing that remuneration was not involved, the
Court held that Primus should not be disciplined 8
In his dissent, Justice Rehnquist again argued that the state should be able
to decide what practicing lawyers are able to do.79 He found that both South
Carolina and Ohio had acted properly and would have affirmed the discipline in
both cases.80
Zauderer
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Councils" involved a number of claimed
violations against a Columbus, Ohio lawyer. The principle advertisement under
attack involved a line drawing of a contraceptive device known as the Dalkon
Shield.8 2 Appearing in many Ohio newspapers, this drawing and accompanying
advertisement resulted in some 106 lawsuits against the manufacturer.
83
Mr. Zauderer was disciplined for violation of an Ohio rule prohibiting the
use of drawings in advertising 84 and for his failure to properly inform prospec-
tive clients about fees.8 5 Although it mentioned fees, the advertisement had not
711d.
721d.
731d. at 431.
74d. at 433 (citing NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
751d. at 433.
761d. at 422.
770hralik, 436 U.S. at 470.
7 5Primus, 436 U.S. at 434.
79d. at 440.
80 d at 441.
81471 U.S. 626 (1985).
821d. at 626.
831d.
841d.
8 5 d.
Fall, 19881
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specifically disclosed that a client might be liable for costs if the suit was unsuc-
cessful 86
The Supreme Court did not find that a significant state interest was served
by the application of Ohio's rules on advertising.8 7 It found the advertising "neither
false nor deceptive." 88 The concern about over-reaching, which the Court voiced
in Ohralik (person-to-person solicitation), was not present in Zauderer and, thus,
posed much less risk to the prospective client.89 The use of illustrations served
important communicative functions9" and the Court was "unsure that the State's
desire that attorneys maintain their dignity in their communication with the public
is an interest substantial enough to justify the abridgement of their First Amend-
ment rights." 91 However, the court affirmed minor disciplinary action with respect
to lack of disclaimers having to do with fees? 2
Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist dissented, finding that there was sufficient
concern about overreaching and undue influence to warrant Ohio's action,93 and
that state regulation was entitled to greater deference than the majority indicated? 4
Although the cases from Bates to Zauderer have helped to define the
parameters of attorney advertising, some issues remain undecided. For example,
in some states rules govern the use of such devices as electronic advertising,
background music, and endorsements.9 5 While the courts have neglected to
specifically address these items, they have given much thought to the problems
related to direct mail advertising.
DIRECT MAIL ADVERTISING
The question of direct mail has been on the periphery of the lawyer adver-
tising question since Bates. Indeed, the difficulty presented by direct mail adver-
tising is whether this activity should be referred to as advertising or solicitation.
Stated another way, the question becomes whether direct mail is more like Bates
(public advertising) or more like Ohralik (person-to-person solicitation). Before
Shapero, the answer was dependent upon the practicing attorney's state, the iden-
tity of the addresses, the content of the mailing, and, perhaps, the number of pieces
of mail utilized.
861d.
87/d. at 642.
88d. at 639.
89d. at 642.
90 d. at 647.
9 1M. at 648.
92d. at 655.
93d. at 673.
94d. at 680.
95See, e.g., Committee on Professional Ethics v. Humphrey, 377 N.W.2d 643 (Iowa, 1985) on general regula-
tions concerning electronic advertising. Also, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Oring v. State Bar
of California, 108 S. Ct. 2895 (1988) (No. 87-1224), which relates to testimonials.
[Vol. 22:2
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DIRECT MAIL PROHIBITED
Herzog
In Dayton Bar Association v. Herzog,96 an attorney mailed between 500 and
1,000 letters to defendants involved in Dayton Municipal Court cases which were
listed in the "Daily Court Reporter." 97 The letters had to do with forestalling col-
lections. 8 The court found a violation of DR2-103: "This patent solicitation is
not the type of constitutionally protected commercial speech discussed in
Bates. . . ."99 The letters created a potential for overreaching and a need for pro-
phylactic regulation. 00
Schrieber
In Florida Bar v. Schrieber,0'1 a lawyer "mailed a letter to Miami Interna-
tional Forewarders ... in which he recommended his employment for immigra-
tion and naturalization matters."' 0 2 The court found that Primus disallowed this
conduct because the subject letter was "motivated by his pecuniary self-interest
and because no political or associational rights was implicated."' 10 3 The court
refused to protect the letter on the grounds of its informational value or social utili-
ty, finding that "the information contained in the letter could be made readily
available through various media sources for any citizen who desired it." 104 The
court found the "reasoning of Ohralik more applicable to our problem than that
of Primus." 105
In summary we find that because respondent's letter implicates neither
political expression nor associational rights, because the social benefits de-
rived from this type of communication are negligible, and because we
perceive certain harms to citizens such as undue influence, invasion of
privacy, and distortion of an attorney's legal judgment, the state has a para-
mount interest in the prohibition of direct mail solicitation motivated sole-
ly by pecuniary interests.
0 6
The Florida Supreme Court decided this case on October 22, 1981.107 The
9670 Ohio St. 2d 261, 436 N.E.2d 1037 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982).
97 1d. at 262, 436 N.E.2d at 1038.
981d.
991d. at 263, 436 N.E.2d at 1038.
10°1d. (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978).
101407 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1981).
102 1d. at 596.
1031d. at 597.
I04 1d"
1051d. at 598.
061d. at 599-600.
107 1d. at 595.
Fall, 19881
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Supreme Court decided R. M.J. just two weeks later on January 25, 1982.108 In
October 1982, the Florida Supreme Court granted Schreiber's motion for extraor-
dinary reconsideration and, in light of R.M.J., withdrew the opinion, deciding
that R. M.J. was controlling.109 The dissent found this to be a solicitation case, and
did not agree that R.M.J. was controlling.'10
Allison
The court in Allison v. Louisiana State Bar Association,11' refused to sanc-
tion a "letter to employers soliciting formation of contracts under which employers
would collect money from wages of employees and send it to attorneys who in
exchange promised to perform specified legal services for the employees." 112 The
court held that this action constituted solicitation which was prohibited by
DR2-103." 3
Since we interpret petitioners' actions as direct solicitation for pecuniary
gain, and since we find the States' traditional and important regulation of
the practice of law by prohibiting solicitation would have no adverse impact
upon constitutional rights (except the lawyer's own right to speak as he
pleases in commercial solicitation) the prohibition against direct solicitation
by lawyers for pecuniary gain will be upheld.
14
Koffler
Koffler v. Joint Bar Association 15 held that direct mail solicitation of potential
clients is constitutionally protected commercial speech which may not be pro-
scribed." 6 In this case, the lawyers addressed some 7,500 individual real property
owners in a letter which solicited the attorney's services in connection with the
sale of real property. During this same period, a letter was mailed to a number
of real estate brokers soliciting them to refer clients to the respondents. They
received approximately 200 closings as a result.1' 7 Aside from the fact that there
may have been some misstatements, the court held that the kind of potential-for
over-reaching which was present and condemned in Ohralik, was not present in
mail solicitation. 18 Therefore, a regulation which completely proscribes the use
108455 U.S. at 191.
109Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 420 So. 2d 599 (1982).
"Old. at 600.
"'1362 So. 2d 489 (La. 1978).
1 21d. at 489.
1131d. at 496.
1141d.
1151 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026 (1981).
1 61d. at 143, 412 N.E.2d at 929, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 873.
111d. at 143-44, 412 N.E.2d at 929, 43 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
ii8"Invasion of privacy and the possibility of overbearing persuasion, both of which were condemned in Ohralik
and which could conceivably be present in telephone solicitation ... are not sufficiently possible in mail
solicitation to justify banning it." Id. at 149, 412 N.E.2d at 933, 43 N.Y.S.2d at 877. 10
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of direct mail cannot be upheld, although other controls might be appropriate. 19
Greene
The Koffler decision spoke to the mailing of letters to individual property
owners and did not reach the question of mailings to brokers. This issue was decid-
ed a year later in Greene. In 1981, the New York Court of Appeals reviewed Greene
v. Grievance Committee for the Ninth Judicial District, 1 20 a case that looks fac-
tually similar to Koffler. The court stated: "Thus, we answer so much of the ques-
tion left open in Matter of Koffler ... concerning third person mailings as relates
to mailings addressed to real estate brokers by holding regulations prescribing
such mailings constitutional." 21
Greene sent some 1,000 direct mail flyers to real estate brokers suggesting
that the brokers recommend Greene to potential property buyers or sellers. 22 The
court relied on Section 479 of the New York Judiciary Law and DR2-103(A)' 23
and found these letters in violation. 24
Here, respondent lawyer sought to have a broker refer clients to him.1 25 It is
this manner of advertising services that runs afoul of the statute, 126 "the statutory
language prohibits all third-party mailings, not just mailings to brokers." 127 The
court found no associational activity in this case, but it did find that a pecuniary
interest existed both to the attorney and the broker, and "since the broker is in
direct contact with his prospect (the lawyer's potential client), there is present also
the in-person solicitation element which Ohralik found sufficient to sustain regula-
tion against constitutional attack." 1 28
More than this, the court found real possibilities of conflict existed. 129
The possibility that the lawyer's view on marketability of title may be col-
ored by his knowledge that the referring broker normally will receive no com-
mission unless title closes, the improbability that the attorney will negotiate
the lowest possible level of commission to be paid to the broker who is an
important source of business for him.. 130
Therefore, mailings to third-parties seeking referral are prohibited.
1191d. at 151, 412 N.E.2d at 934, 43 N.Y.S.2d at 878.
12054 N.Y.2d 118, 429 N.E.2d 390, 444 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035 (1982).
1211d. at 121, 429 N.E.2d at 391, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 884.
1221d.
1231d. at 123-24, 429 N.E.2d at 392-93, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 885-86.
1241d. at 125, 429 N.E.2d at 393, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 886.
1251d. at 126, 429 N.E.2d at 394, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 887.
12 6 1d.
1271d.
1281d. at 128, 429 N.E.2d at 395, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 888.
1291d. at 129, 429 N.E.2d at 396, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
130 1d.
Fall, 19881
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Moses
In State v. Moses,131 a lawyer sent letters to potential homesellers suggesting
the values and benefits of selling their home and offered his services. 32 The court
held:
The distinction between advertising, which may not be prohibited, and direct
solicitation which may, is a fine one but we are convinced such a distinction
is justified. Traditionally, the prohibition against direct solicitation has been
directed to the evils inherent in 'ambulance chasing' and the detriment
members of the public may suffer by such solicitation.
33
The solicitation in the instant case, while not being in the nature of ambulance
chasing and hospital room solicitation, nevertheless is directed to a segment
of the public which under present economic conditions, is extremely vul-
nerable to a suggestion of employment that may or may not be advanta-
geous...134
Alessi
Finally, in the 1983 case of Alessi v. Committee on Professional Standards,
35
the mailings sought engagement to render legal services in connection with real
estate closings. 36 Again, the court found a potential for conflict and prohibited
these mailings. 37
In some cases, the reasons for disallowing the advertising are found in its con-
tents, which are misleading or inappropriate in some way. However, at times ad-
vertising is permitted because it may be allowed under rules permitting client
contact.
In re Madsen,138 the activity occurred before Bates, but was decided after-
ward. The Illinois Supreme Court determined that the activity was permissible,
and not subject to discipline, 39 for two lawyers to send over two thousand letters
to their clients entitled "Tips from your Lawyer for 1973" along with a pamphlet
extolling the virtues of having a will."40 This activity was supported against allega-
tions that it was "self laudatory... calculated to attract lay clients.... (and) gave
unsolicited advice." ' 4
.31231 Kan. 243, 642 P.2d 1004 (1982).
1321d. at 244-45, 642 P.2d at 1006.
1331d. at 246, 642 P.2d at 1007.
1341d.
13-60 N.Y.2d 229, 457 N.E.2d 682, 469 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102 (1984).
1361d. at 231, 457 N.E.2d at 683, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
1371d. at 235, 457 N.E.2d at 686, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 581.
13868 I1. 2d 472, 370 N.E.2d 199 (1977).
1391d. at 478, 370 N.E.2d at 202.
1401d. at 474, 370 N.E.2d at 200.
1411d.
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Communication with one's clients comes within the disciplinary rule pro-
tection of DR2-104 which states, inter alia: "a lawyer who has given in-person
unsolicited advice to a layperson ... shall not accept employment resulting from
that advice, except that: (1) a lawyer may accept employment by a close friend,
relative, former client ... or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be a
client." 142
FALSE, MISLEADING OR INAPPROPRIATE
Direct mail, as in all other forms of advertising, must not be false or mis-
leading. Some of the direct mail cases turn on that determination as illustrated
below.
Eaton
For example, Eaton v. Supreme Court ofArkansas143 involved the distribu-
tion of a lawyer advertisement by inclusion in a packet with other discount
coupons. 44 This advertisement listed a $10.00 first consultation fee and a series
of questions. 45
The Arkansas Supreme Court held this advertisement was improper because
"we fail to see how this broad sweep ('Other legal problems?'), without any in-
dication of charges, is sufficient information to assist one in need of legal services
to make an informed selection."' 46 The court also held "the manner of dissemina-
tion is impermissible," 147 and "in violation of the rule requiring such adver-
tisements to be informative in nature." '
48
Von Wiegen
In Von Wiegen, 149 the New York Court of Appeals found the direct mail
solicitation to contain deceptive statements which justified imposition of sanc-
tions. 50 Von Wiegen (from his upstate New York office) had mailed letters to vic-
tims and families of the 250 persons injured in the collapse of the skywalk in the
Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri.151 The deception involved
statements to the effect that a litigation coordinating committee had been formed
14 2MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104 (1981).
141270 Ark. 573, 607 S.W.2d 55 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981).
'"Id. at 576, 607 S.W.2d at 56.
1451d. at 580, 607 S.W.2d at 59.
1461d.
1471d.
1491d.
14963 N.Y.2d 163,470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1984), on remand, 108 App. Div. 2d 1012, 485 N.Y.S.
2d 399, cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1007 (1985) on remand, the Von Wiegen court upheld the disciplinary action
for misleading or deceptive statements.
1501d. at 163, 470 N.E.2d at 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 40.
11d. at 167, 470 N.E.2d at 840, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 42.
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to assist the disaster victims and that many accident victims had requested
representation. 152 In truth, the attorney and his former secretary were the sole
members of the committee and at the time the letter was sent, some families had
contacted the lawyer, but none in fact had requested representation.
1 3
Leoni
In Leoni v. State Bar of California,54 attorneys sent letters to defendants re-
garding legal aspects of debt problems. 55 The recipients were principally defen-
dants in small claims or municipal court actions or were owners of real proper-
ty which was in foreclosure; their names and addresses were obtained through
public records.156 Some "83 different versions of the letters and informational
enclosures were sent to approximately 250,000 recipients.157 The type of letter
and enclosure received depended on the type of defendant... and the proce-
dural stage of the case against the defendant" 158 and packets were included in the
mailings with information about bankruptcy.159 The lawyers were charged with
violations of various California State disciplinary rules, including one rule which
prohibited communication with parties represented by council if the topic of
discussion was their present representation, and another rule which prohibited
the omission of necessary facts.'
60
The court determined that the proper analysis was to consider these mail-
ings commercial speech,16' and determined that the state may regulate any adver-
tising considered false or misleading. 162 Having upheld the validity of Califor-
nia rule 2-101(a), the court held this massive mailing campaign to be misleading: 1
63
"the letters have a likelihood of misleading the public and actually did mislead
members of the public. This massive advertising campaign which seemed to per-
sonalize letters to individuals named as defendants in pending lawsuits was almost
certain to cause panic and to mislead the recipients." 1
64
In addition, the court held that the letters violated Rules 2-101(a)(3) in that
they omitted to state facts necessary to make the material not misleading. 65 This
15 2 1d.
153 d. at 176, 470 N.E.2d at 845, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 47.
15439 Cal. 3d 609, 613, 704 P.2d 183, 185, 217 Cal. Rptr. 423, 425 (1985).
1551d. at 615, 704 P.2d at 186, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 426.
56Id.
1571d"
1581d.
591d.
16/d. at 617, 704 P.2d at 187, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 427.
1611d. at 623, 704 P.2d at 192, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
1621d.
1631d. at 625, 704 P.2d at 193, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
164Id. at 627, 704 P.2d at 194, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
1651d.
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violation occurred because the letters stated a figure for fees which was mis-
leading. 66 Additionally, the mailings did not "clearly identify the message as a
communication for employment" 167 and the format involved "intrusion, threats,
intimidation, harassment or duress."' 68 Leoni also raised an additional ethical
problem.1 69
Direct Mail Allowed
A series of cases in various courts from 1978 to 1986, refused to discipline
lawyers for direct mail advertising-solicitation, thus presaging Shapero.
Kentucky Bar Association v. Stuart involved an attempt "to impose discipline
for alleged personal solicitation of legal business"' 170 Attorneys mailed letters to
two real estate agents setting forth fees for various activities. 71 The Association
had determined that the letters violated DR 2103(A) and recommended a repri-
mand.172 The court was "not persuaded the letters in this case constitute 'in-person
solicitation' any more than any other form of advertising." 173 "None of the evils
are present here which exist in the case of 'in-person solicitation.' "174 This form
of advertising is protected.
In In re Appert, two personal injury lawyers, prepared a brochure entitled,
"Women Who Have Used Dalkon Shield" and noted their experience in such
litigation. 75 This letter was sent to some 150-250 people including friends, clients
and former clients whose names appeared on a mailing list which the attorneys
compiled. 76 The court held this activity was constitutionally protected and that
any blanket prohibition would be improper.177 "The character of the mailing, be
it solicitation or advertising, should not be treated as significant. Rather, the poten-
tial for abuse and the strength of the state's interest in preventing the abuse must
be viewed as determinative." 17
8
1661d.
1671d.
1681d.
169Leoni also raised the problem of violation of DR 7-104 (apparently 7-103 in California or Model Rule 4.2)
having to do with contacting a client already represented by counsel. Having taken the information for the
thousands of mailings from the court records, the court noted: "Because Greenberg appeared as attorney of
record in the court file, the panel further concluded that petitioners communicated with a party whom they
knew, or constructively knew, was represented by counsel upon a subject of controversy in violation of Rule
7-103." Id. at 618, 704 P.2d at 188, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
170568 S.W.2d 933, 933 (Ky. 1978).
171Id.
1721d.
1731d. at 934.
1741d.
175315 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1981).
1761d. at 206.
177d. at 209.
178d. at 211.
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In Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct of the Iowa State
Bar Association, a number of state prohibitions against lawyer advertising were
challenged. 79 These included prohibitions against claims of quality, appeals to
emotion or prejudice as well as restrictions on where and what kinds of publica-
tions were permissible. 80 The court upheld certain restrictions including the pro-
hibition against any claims of quality,'8 ' restrictions on "appeals to emotions, prej-
udices or likes or dislikes of a person" 8 2 and use of symbols,' 83 but declined to
approve a rule prohibiting the mention of race.'
84
As far as banning direct mail, the court has considered arguments relating
to conflict of interest; 85 over-commercialization (prohibition is too extensive a
remedy);' 86 invasion of privacy,' 87 and deception' 88 concluding that "disciplinary
rules, insofar as they prohibit... direct mail advertising, violate plaintiffs First
Amendment right of commercial speech." 
89
The Utah Supreme Court in In re Utah State Bar Petition for Approval of
Changes of Disciplinary Rules of Advertising,'9 held that a prohibition of all direct
mail contact with prospective clients could not be adopted because it was con-
trary to R. M.J.191 The court remanded the question to the Board for revision.
92
It should be noted that the court upheld restrictions on advertising on billboards,
circulars, matchbooks and inscribed pens and pencils.
193
In 1984, Spencer v. Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court of Pennsyl-
vania, 94 held that disciplinary rules could not blanketly restrict the use of direct
mail. 95 In this case, an attorney wished to limit his practice to certain fields and
"to communicate his credentials ... and direct mailings to targeted segments of
the population and specifically named individuals with legal needs in these areas"
(aviation and computers).' 96 Although upholding the state prohibition of the use
179521 F Supp. 1219 (S.D. Iowa 1981), vacated on other grounds, 686 F2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1982).
1 801d. at 1224.
1811d. at 1225.
1821d.
1831d. at 1226.
1841d. at 1227.
1851d. at 1231.
1861d.
18/d. at 1232.
189Id.
1-647 P.2d 991 (1982).
1911d. at 995.
19 21d. at 997.
1931d. at 995.
194579 F. Supp. 880 (1984).
195Id. at 889.
196 1d. at 882. 16
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of terms which subjectively evaluate a lawyer's credentials, 97 the court refused
to uphold an absolute ban on direct mail solicitation'98 after a careful review of
the possibilities of invasion of privacy, 99 undue influence and overreaching,
20 0
and conflicts of interest 0 'l The court said "in the absence of any showing of how
a conflict of interest would arise through direct mail solicitation, the State's total
prohibition of such solicitation cannot be sustained on that ground." 202 "Direct
mail solicitation can provide the public with useful information regarding legal
rights, remedies, and services. Further, to prohibit lawyers from selecting as to
the recipients of their communications those who may be most in need of a
lawyer's services would totally ignore the reason commercial speech is constitu-
tionally protected....
In the case of Hartford-New Britain Judicial District v. Trantolo,20 4 the court
dealt with printed announcements which had been mailed to approximately
twenty-five Hartford area realtors along with a brochure explaining the nature
of the legal clinic and the fees charged2 05 The trial court found that this mailing
of brochures and invitation to an open house constituted solicitation2 0 6 The Con-
necticut Supreme Court, applying the Central Hudson test, did not find the adver-
tisement unlawful or misleading and concluded that "the blanket prohibition of
mailed solicitations ... violates the free speech provision of the United States
Constitution and the Connecticut Constitution" 207 and there were less intrusive
means of satisfying the state's concerns. 20 8
In Adams v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the
Supreme Court of Illinois, the district court held subject attorneys were entitled
to preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the Code of Professional
Responsibility prohibiting direct mail advertising to target audiences0 9 The Il-
linois Supreme Court had amended DR 2-103 to permit written communication
distributed generally to persons only if plainly labeled as advertising material.210
The lawyers in this case sent mailings to those individuals they thought were in
need of services with respect to specific problems. The list for the mailings was
1971d. at 888.
198 d. at 891.
1991d. at 889.
200 d at 890.
20 11d.
202 1d.
203 d. at 891.
204192 Conn. 27, 470 A.2d 235 (1984).
2051d. at 29, 470 A.2d at 236.
106 d. at 30, 470 A.2d at 236-37.
2071d. at 34-35, 470 A.2d at 239.
2081d. at 35, 470 A.2d at 239.
209617 F Supp. 449 (D.C. Ill. 1985), afftd, 801 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1986).
210 d. at 450.
Fall, 1988]
17
Becker: Shapero - Direct Mail Clarified
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1989
[Vol. 22:2AKRON LAW REVIEW
derived from agencies responsible for keeping track of people with these kinds
of problems.21I This case reached the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
and was affirmed.
212
In Von Weigen, the court refused to uphold the prohibition on direct mail
advertising213 finding such ban unnecessary to protect against an invasion of
privacy or against undue influence or over-reaching.
21 4
CONCLUSION
What, then, are the guidelines that might govern lawyers as they look at possi-
ble advertising/solicitation activities in the light of Shapero?
It seems clear that any blanket prohibition against direct mail is now impossi-
ble. It seems equally clear that any false or misleading information contained in
such direct mail may be prohibited by the Von Weigen decision.
2 1 5 Similarly, if
some mailings have inherent aspects of abuse or confusion attached to them as
in Leoni, they will be prohibited. 2 16 Any attempt to distinguish between general
direct mail and targeted direct mail will probably not survive despite the fact that
this distinction appears to be a useful and valid one. According to Greene, direct
mail advertising or solicitation of third parties in which a conflict of interest may
be inherent or which might arise will also be prohibited.
21 7
However, one might posit a set of circumstances in which disaster, time and
vulnerability might combine to support prohibition of direct mail contact. Cer-
tainly the facts set forth in the Adams case where a telegram addressed to survivors
was sent within two hours of a fatal accident, is the sort of activity which might
invite and sustain disciplinary action.
21 8
Recently, the National Law Journal reported
219 a situation which arose out
of the Norco Louisiana disaster. In that incident, certain plaintiffs attorneys ap-
peared on television news programs and gave information with respect to
claimants' rights. The article indicates that the American Trial Lawyers' Associa-
tion (ATLA) was considering additional restrictions on solicitation, including
restrictions on lawyers initiating television appearances or media comments within
ten days of an injury-causing event, unless attorneys waive their fees. 2 0 (The article
also states that direct mail was also used, presumably permitted by Shapero.)
21 1 d. at 451.
212801 F.2d 968 (7th Cir. 1986).
71363 N.Y.2d at 170, 470 N.E.2d at 841, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
2141d. at 174, 470 N.E.2d at 844, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 46.
215Von Weigen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40.
216Leoni, 39 Cal. 3d 609, 704 P.2d 183, 217 Cal. Rptr. 423.
217Greene, 54 N.Y.2d 118, 429 N.E.2d 390, 444 N.Y.S.2d 883.
218Adams, 617 F. Supp. at 454 & n.2.
219Blum, ATLA ires Again on Solicitation, Nat'l L. J., July 25, 1988, at 10, col. 3.
220d. at 10, col. 4. 18
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At the annual meeting, ATLA actually "adopted a new code of conduct that
prohibits any ATLA member from personally contacting an injured person to
solicit a potential client if no request for such a visit was made." It also forbids
members contacting the media within ten days of an injury-causing event. 22'
Although Shapero places no restrictions on telephone solicitation or television
appearances, it may be that telegrams are the kind of direct mail that might, under
some circumstances, run afoul of solicitation rules. In fact, if a lawyer is able to
target his mail with great specificity as to the subject matter and characteristics
(personal or legal) of the recipient, and individually address such mail, we must
ask what actions are left to be proscribed by the solicitation prohibitions of DR
2-103 or Model Rule 7.3? Indeed, is such proscription anti-competitive?
Answers to these questions are needed, and it is likely that courts will con-
tinue to wrestle with the problems these forms of advertising present. With the
growing capabilities of computer systems and telecommunications, Ohralik and
Shapero will remain as the touchstones for future court decisions. All lawyers
would be well advised to carefully consider what Shapero has sanctioned. The
opening permitted by the Supreme Court for direct contact with potential clients
is a significant one.
22
'Blum, Hot Convention Issues Solicitation, Minorities, Nat'l L. J., Aug. 15, 1988, at 3, col. 3.
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